



Date: September 29, 2026

Topic: Intelivote Systems - General Comments on Election Results and Security Questions

Intelivote is providing our services to 97 Ontario municipalities in October 2026, servicing just over 750,000 eligible electors many of whom have been using our services for 4 election cycles dating back to 2010, so we have the security and integrity of a trusted team of professionals that has a reputation for operational excellence in online election delivery.

As a basic security premise of the system, it is important to understand that access to various modules and features is controlled by the authorization level given to the various stakeholders in the election, when they are assigned a user ID. Certain modules provide access to view information as the election enters various stages during the election cycle.

These stages include DRAFT mode, where the election is custom configured to each municipality ensuring that the setup for each race where a ballot will be cast (Mayor, Councillor, School Board, Plebiscite Question, etc.) is configured both for internet and phone voting (and sometimes paper), and the final review by the election authorities (the clerk acting as the returning officer) as per the legislation, review and approve the setup of the races.

This typically includes information for the voter ensuring the race can only have the correct number of selections; "Pick only 1 Candidate", "Pick not more than 4 Candidates", etc, amongst numerous other settings. This also includes including candidate names and the audio recording of their names for phone voting and typically awaiting the end of the nomination period for candidates to be declared, and/or races being acclaimed.

All this activity occurs over many months on a schedule that we use to ensure the information we get from the clerk is on time to meet the legislated timelines.

Credentials are provided to the identified election officials provided to us by the clerk. This would typically include the clerk (legislatively the Return Officer), the Deputy Returning Officer(s) referred to as DRO, the System Auditor provided by the municipality, and the assigned Voter Help Line staff, who may also hold the position of a DRO depending on the staffing requirements of the election, as determined by the clerk.

These individuals are assigned user IDs and depending on their roles, they have access to election information, particularly the list of electors provided by Elections Ontario. Their credentials can only be used during certain periods and requires that a two-factor authentication (2FA) additional credential is invoked, and verified, whenever they access the system.

It is important to note that no capability exists for any individual to see the candidate selection of an elector, during or after the election. Further, the count of votes is not performed until the election is set to a FINAL status at the end of the voting period.

1. Who has access to election results?

During the voting period, and particularly once voting closes, which individuals or positions have access to the vote totals and final results? Does this include municipal election staff, Intelivote staff, the Clerk/Returning Officer, or any other individuals?

Intelivote: Vote totals only become available to authorized personnel after the election goes into a “FINAL” status. When the election is running the election status is deemed “ACTIVE” and prior to the start of the election the required credentials are provided to the individuals named by the clerk, depending on their roles performed during the election period.(as described above).

The vote results are triggered by the Returning Officer (clerk typically) using the Reports feature at the end of the election once the designated time for the end of the election has occurred. The system can also be configured to automatically stop at a predetermined time. The auditor additionally triggers a report, and their two reports are compared, verified, and signatures attached. This report is also generated at the end of the election by Intelivote for backup purposes, if for example the electoral authorities or the auditor is unable to run the report on their system. (local internet issues, etc.).

2. When do results become accessible?

Are vote totals inaccessible to municipal staff while voting is underway? Once the polls close, what process is followed to unlock, generate or release the results, and who is involved in that process?

Intelivote: No results are tallied or available during the election, and thus not reviewable by anyone. As noted above, the authorized election officials trigger the results using their credentials after the election has been deemed “FINISHED” by the election officials. Reviewing the results and publishing them to the public follows a schedule that the clerk follows, with the Official Results being delivered by them the day after Election Day. Un-official results are often released by the election officials on Election Day evening.

3. What safeguards prevent internal alteration of results?

What technical and procedural safeguards are in place to ensure that an authorized municipal user cannot alter the election outcome within the system — for example, by changing candidate vote totals, modifying the association between a candidate's name and their vote total, or otherwise manipulating the final results?

Intelivote: As described above the results of the election are not tallied until the election is over. The cast votes are encrypted both in transit from the voter's device (PC/phone/tablet, etc) to the system and the values are hashed in transit, and are stored in an encrypted format.

4. Audit trail and verification

Does the system maintain an immutable audit log showing access to the election system and any administrative activity? If a change were made to election configuration, candidate information or any other component capable of affecting the reported results, would that action be recorded, including who made it and when?

Intelivote: An immutable log does exist that records and monitors all activity of any, and all, users of the system. The system cannot be altered after it is moved to an ACTIVE state, and all activity is tracked and reviewed in real time by the operations features of the system.

5. Independent verification of results

What process exists for independently verifying that the results released by the municipality accurately reflect the ballots recorded by Intelivote? Is there a report, audit certificate or other record produced directly by Intelivote against which the municipality's published results can be compared?

Intelivote: As noted above the results are produced by the system after both the Election Officials and the Auditor independently generate the tallied results using their credentials, often in the presence of scrutineers or agents at an officially designated location. As noted earlier, Intelivote also generates Finalized Election Results which can be compared to the Election Official's results.

6. Candidate names and ballot configuration

Once voting has commenced, is it technically possible for municipal election staff to alter candidate names, candidate IDs, ballot positioning or the mapping between candidates and recorded vote totals? If not, could you explain what prevents such changes?

Intelivote: Municipal election staff are not provided credentials to modify any candidate status information prior to or during the election. Even Intelivote technical staff cannot alter information in an ACTIVE event as the system restricts access and capabilities that would enable this.